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I. INTRODUCTION
At common law there was no physician-patient privilege for confi-
dential information imparted in the course of the medical relation-
ship.' However, beginning with New York in 1828,2 most states have
enacted statutes that protect disclosures made in the course of the
1. E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIs EVIDENCE § 10.20 (2d ed. 1963); MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 98 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. II N.Y. REV. STATS., pt. III, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73 (1829). The New York statute
served as a model for many other states and provided that:
No person duly authorised (sic) to practice physic or surgery shall be
allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired in at-
tending any patient, in a professional character, and which information
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician,
or to do any act for him, as a surgeon.
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physician-patient relationship.3
The usual policy justification for the privilege is that it promotes
the general health and welfare by assuring that the intimate details a
patient reveals to his or her physician will not be disclosed to the gen-
eral public to the patient's humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace.4
Thus, patients will not hesitate to seek medical attention and to give
the physician all possible relevant information.5
Another justification for the privilege is that it protects doctors
from the possible legal consequences arising from conflicts between
the professional ethical duty of silence and the legal duty of disclo-
sure.6 Furthermore, at least one commentator has asserted that the
real force underlying the privilege is the pressure exerted on legisla-
tures by the medical profession's "natural repugnance to becoming the
means of disclosure of a personal confidence." 7 In addition, others
have justified the privilege on the basis of the special fiduciary rela-
tionship between a doctor and patient and a "theory of community
outrage and repugnance at having one's physician act against his pa-
tient's interest."8 As a result, there is a limit the community places
on a search for truth when a medical relationship intervenes. Thus,
legislatures have recognized that in certain instances the needs of jus-
tice will be subrogated to the privacy rights of patients via invocation
of the physician-patient privilege.9
One of the latest states to adopt the physician-patient privilege was
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2380 n.5 (compiles and quotes relevant parts of
these statutes). See also Note, The Physician-Patient Privilege, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
263, 264 n.6 (1961).
4. Note, supra note 3, at 266.
5. In justifying establishment of the privilege, the New York Commissioners on Re-
vision stated that "unless such consultations are privileged, men will be inciden-
tally punished by being obliged to suffer the consequences of injuries without
relief from the medical art .... " III N.Y. REV. STATs. 737 (2d ed. 1836). See also
Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876), reflecting that the New
York statute:
[I]s a just and useful enactment, introduced to give protection to those
who were in [the] charge of physicians from the secrets disclosed to en-
able them properly to prescribe for deseases of the patient. To open the
door to the disclosure of secrets revealed on the sick bed, or when con-
sulting a physician, would destroy confidence between the physician and
the patient, and, it is easy to see, might tend very much to prevent the
advantages and benefits which flow from this confidential relationship.
6. See supra note 4 (fear of perjury when called upon to testify). See also III N.Y.
REV. STATS. 737 (2d ed. 1836): "[D]uring the struggle between legal duty on the
one hand, and professional honor on the other, the latter, aided by a strong sense
of the injustice and inhumanity of the rule, will, in most cases, furnish a tempta-
tion to the pervasion or concealment of truth, too strong for human resistance."
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2380(a).
8. Note, supra note 3, at 267.
9. Id.
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Illinois.o A recent case heard by the Illinois Supreme Court tested
the scope of this privilege.ll Although the Illinois statute is similar to
many other states' statutes, in that it allows for fairly broad applicaton
aside from certain enumerated exceptions,12 the court construed the
statute narrowly so as to exclude application of the privilege where
the names of women visting an abortion clinic were subpoenaed by a
grand jury. This Article will review the analysis of the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. '7orendo,13 and discuss its relation to the
general physician-patient privilege adopted in most jurisdictions.
II. FACTS AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
On February 21,1979 an Illinois grand jury issued a subpoena duces
tecum ordering Dr. Regalado Florendo, as president of the Michigan
Avenue Medical Center, to produce medical, billing, and receipt
records for thirty-four listed "case numbers" and thirteen named indi-
viduals.14 The information sought concerned patients who had re-
ceived public aid in obtaining treatment at the Medical Center. The
defendant subsequently made a motion to quash the subpoena based
on his interpretation of the physician-patient privilege. 15 In response,
the trial court ruled that the scope of the subpoena included only pho-
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1979). The first version of this Act was adopted in
1959. This statute provides:
No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information
he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professonal
character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve such
patient, except only (1) in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates
directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in
actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for malpractice, (3) with
the expressed consent of the patient, or in case of his or her death or
disability, of his or her personal representative or other person author-
ized to sue for personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance policy
on his or her life, health, or physical condition, (4) in all actions brought
by or against the patient, his or her personal representative, a benefici-
ary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or administrator of his or
her estate wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is an issue,
(5) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will of the patient,
(6) in any criminal action where the charge is either murder by abortion,
attempted abortion or abortion, (7) in actions, civil or criminal, arising
from the filing of a report in compliance with the "Abused and Ne-
glected Child Reporting Act", approved June 26, 1975 or (8) to any de-
partment, agency, institution or facility which has custody of the patient
pursuant to State statute or any court order of commitment.
11. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 447 N.E.2d 282 (1983).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1979). See supra note 10 for a listing of the eight
exceptions to the physician-patient privilege.
13. 95 Ill. 2d 155, 447 N.E.2d 282 (1983).
14. The subpoena commanded the defendant to produce "'any and all medical
records including but not limited to treatment, correspondence and billing and
receipt records'...." Id. at 602, 420 N.E.2d at 507.
15. The defendant apparently placed the requested documents in the custody of the
[Vol. 64:772
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tocopies of the patient's identification cards, resulting in disclosure of
their names.
The defendant refused to disclose the names of the women treated
at the Medical Center. He felt that to do so would necessarily reveal
other privileged information regarding their treatment, since the
Center only provided abortion related services. The trial court re-
jected the defendant's argument and issued an impounding order for
the documents. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling
based on its conclusion that "the public's interest in maintaining the
power of the grand jury" outweighed the patients' interest in avoiding
revelation of their identities.16 On appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, the majority affirmed the appellate court decision and held that
the subpoena did not violate the physician-patient privilege. 17
III. ANALYSIS
In reaching its decision in Florendo, the Illinois Supreme Court ap-
plied a balancing test whereby the individual's interest "in maintain-
ing confidentiality in his or her dealings with a physician"'s was
weighed against the public interest "in maintaining the breadth of the
grand jury's power to conduct investigations necessary to ferret out
criminal activity."'19 The court noted that the grand jury's power
should be afforded "the broadest scope possible" consistent with con-
stitutional limitations, and therefore held that the balance in the pres-
ent case favored the public interest.20 The court based its decision on
four arguments. First, the "plain meaning" of the statute limits appli-
cation of the privilege to information necessary to enable a physician
to render professsional services. Since "mere identification" is not re-
quired for treatment it falls outside its scope. Second, courts reaching
a contrary result have involved civil proceedings and are therefore dis-
tinguishable from the present controversy. Third, any intrusion on
the women's privacy rights will be minimal and will be safeguarded
sufficiently by the peculiar nature of the grand jury investigation.
Fourth, the women affected had received public-aid funds to help pay
for their treatment and had impliedly waived the privilege to a signifi-
cant extent. Close scrutiny of the relevant authorities, however, ren-
ders the court's reasoning unpersuasive in light of the extreme
trial court for safekeeping while the case proceeded in the lower courts. Id. at 602
n.1, 420 N.E.2d at 507 n.1.
16. Id. at 157, 447 N.E.2d at 283 (quoting People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. App. 3d 601, 605,
420 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1981)).
17. Id. at 155, 447 N.E.2d at 282 (quoting People v. Bickham, 89 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 431 N.E.2d
365, 368 (1982).
18. Id. at 158, 447 N.E.2d at 284.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 159, 447 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting People v. Dorr, 47 Ill. 2d 458, 462, 265 N.E.2d
601, 603 (1970)).
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personal intrusions that might result and the legislative policy under-
lying the privilege. Therefore, the remaining sections of this Article
will examine each of the above arguments in some detail.
1. The Illinois Statute May be Interpreted to Protect Disclosure of
Patients' Names
The statute creating the Illinois physician-patient privilege pro-
vides: "No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any in-
formation he may have acquired in attending any patient in a
professional character, necessary to enable him professionally to serve
such patient ... "21 The statute then lists eight exceptions to the
privilege, none of which were found applicable to the present case.22
Based on a narrow interpretation of this statute, the State argued suc-
cessfully that "the privilege has no application when, as here, the only
thing sought from the physician are [sic] the names of his patients."23
The State relied on a 1979 appellate court decision, Geisberger v. Wil-
luhn,24 wherein the appellate court held that disclosure of the pa-
tient's name alone did not violate the privilege since a "physician need
not know the name of the patient in order to treat him ....
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1979).
22. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 158, 447 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1983). See also supra
note 10 for a list of the eight exceptions. The appellate court briefly considered
and rejected application of exceptions (2) and (6) to the present circumstances.
Exception (2) applies to physician malpractice actions. The court noted that "the
state does not indicate its basis for asserting that a malpractice action is involved
here" and therefore found this exception to be inapplicable. Exception (6) ap-
plies to criminal actions where the charge is either murder by abortion, at-
tempted abortion, or abortion. The court rejected application this exception
because the vague nature of the subpeona prohibited a presumption that the in-
vestigation involved a criminal action for abortion. People v. Florendo, 95 IMl.
App. 3d 601, 603-04, 420 N.E.2d 506, 507-08 (1981).
23. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. App. 3d 601, 604, 420 N.E.2d 506, 508 (1981).
24. 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979). In this case, a patient brought an action
against his physician for disclosure of his name to the police in connection with an
armed robbery. Count X of patient-plaintiff's complaint alleged that the disclo-
sure of his name by the doctor's employee constituted a breach of the physician-
patient privilege established by statute. Count XI alleged that the disclosure of
the plaintiff's name constituted a breach of an implied contract not to divulge
confidential information acquired through the physician-patient relationship.
This implied contract was alleged to arise out of custom and usage in the commu-
nity, the statutory physician-patient privilege, and the Hippocratic Oath and Ca-
nons of Medical Ethics. Count XII alleged that the disclosure constituted an
invasion of privacy. Id. at 436, 390 N.E.2d at 946.
25. Id. at 437, 390 N.E.2d at 947. The court relied on the authority of CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM: "the privilege exists as to, and only as to, information necessary to
enable the physician to act or serve in a professional capacity, that is, to informa-
tion necessary to act or prescribe for patient, or diagnose or treat his ailments
.... " 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 295b(2) (1957). However, the court distinguished
cases such as Geisberger where the circumstances surrounding the disclosure of
patients' names necessarily revealed privileged information regarding their treat-
[Vol. 64:772
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In the present case, the defendant agreed that as a general proposi-
tion a patient's name is not per se privileged,26 but countered that in
certain instances a name may be privileged if its disclosure inevitably
leads to revelation of other traditionally privileged information.2 7
Therefore, the defendant argued that the names ordered by the sub-
poena were privileged since the patients involved were treated at a
clinic offering exclusively abortion-related services.28
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, rejected straightforward ap-
plication of the statutory physician-patient privilege to such cases. In-
stead, it established what appeared to be a conditional privilege for
disclosure of patient names.2 9 The court ruled that patient names
would not be privileged whenever the public interest in elimination of
criminal activity outweighed the individual's interest in confidential-
ity of medical dealings.3 0 It is important to note that such a balancing
test was only applied to disclosure of patient names and not to any
other traditionally privileged information. Although the court offered
several policy arguments justifying its special treatment of patient
names,3 ' the primary reason was to enable the grand jury to locate
potential witnesses and obtain waivers of the physician-patient privi-
lege in order to obtain other medical information.3 2
An alternative position proposed by the defendant and adopted by
ment. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 437, 390 N.E.2d 945, 947 (1979).
The fundamental difference was illustrated by the following quote from Marcus
v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1971):
We recognize that the disclosure of the patient's name does not necessar-
ily violate the privilege .... In the case at bench it is not merely the
disclosure of the name and address, but the joining of that information
with the limitation in the question that these were patients who had re-
ceived the specified tests.
26. The dissent, however, notes that the defendant's brief may be read not to concede
this point but rather to argue that in cases such as the present one, patient's
names should be privileged. People v. Florendo, 95 111. 2d 155, 165,447 N.E.2d 282,
287 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 160, 447 N.E.2d at 285. This position has been adopted by a number of other
courts. See, ag., Rudnick v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 603 (1974); Marcus v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1971); Schechet v. Kesten, 372 Mich. 346, 126 N.W.2d 718 (1964).
28. In a similar case, a California court recognized that "persons do not ordinarily
consult physicians from idle curiosity." Marcus v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d
22, 24,95 Cal. Rptr. 545,547 (1971). Thus, the Marcus court held that disclosure of
patients' names and addresses, in a context that necessarily revealed information
concerning their condition or the physician's diagnosis, was protected by the phy-
sician-patient privilege. Id.
29. This is not a "conditionally privileged communication" in the sense the term is
used in certain tort law contexts. Rather the term "conditonal privilege" here
refers to a privilege whose application is dependant on the presence of a predeter-
mined set of circumstances.
30. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 447 N.E.2d 282 (1983).
31. These policy arguments will be discussed in the remaining sections of this Article.
32. Id. at 161, 447 N.E.2d at 285.
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
a number of other courts provides that, at least in certain contexts,
disclosure of patient names should be protected under the traditional
statutory physician-patient privilege. If this view is followed, there is
no need to apply a balancing test since the legislature has already de-
fined the scope of the privilege, which leaves no room for judicial dis-
cretion.33 It may be argued that such a view more closely effectuates
the avowed purpose of the privilege: "to encourage free disclosure be-
tween the physician and the patient and to protect the patient from
the embarrassment and invasion of privacy that disclosure would
entail."34
In his comprehensive dissent, Judge Simon took this alternative
position one step further. He contended that it is unrealistic to con-
clude that a patient's name is not in the first instance necessary to
enable a physician to professionally serve his or her patient.3 5 Judge
Simon noted that knowledge of the patient's name is necessary to pre-
scribe medication as well as for many other routine medical dealings.3 6
Therefore, he concluded logically that disclosure of the patient's name
was protected by the "plain meaning" of the statute.3 7
33. Such a view has had support from one commentator who notes that "exceptions
to the physician-patient privilege are within the legislative domain since the legis-
lature is the exponent of both the privilege and its exceptions." Note, Physician-
Patient Privilege Prevents Disclosure of Patient's Identity to Grand Jury Homi-
cide Investigation, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 434, 439 (1984).
34. People v. Herbert, 108 Ill. App. 3d 143, 149 438 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (1982).
35. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 165-66, 447 N.E.2d 282, 287 (1983) (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
36. Id. Judge Simon noted, for example:
If it became necessary during the abortion to transfer a patient to a hos-
pital, how could that be accomplished if defendant did not know her
name? If for some reason it was necessary to impart information about
the patient's condition to the patient, how could that be done if the de-
fendant did not have her name or at least her address or telephone
number? A physician who performed a surgical procedure without
knowing how to identify his patient for admission to a hospital, who to
contact in case an emergency arose or how to contact the patient later if
it were necessary to do so would be guilty of extremely sloppy practice, if
not malpractice. This is particularly true, I should think, in the case of a
surgical procedure such as an abortion.
Id.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1979), provides that the privilege shall extend to
"any information [a physician] may have acquired in attending any patient in a
professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve
such patient ......
The Michigan Supreme Court has interpreted a similar statute to extend the
physician-patient privilege to names and treatment of patients who were not par-
ties to the action:
The statute imposed an absolute bar. It protects "within the veil of privi-
lege," whatever in order to enable the physician to prescribe, "was dis-
closed to any of his senses, and which in any way was brought to his
knowledge for that purpose ...." It prohibits the physician from dis-
closing, in the course of any action wherein his patient or patients are
[Vol. 64:772
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The majority apparently rejected both these alternative views and
instead adopted a new rule whereby (at least in criminal cases) pa-
tients' names will not be privileged, regardless of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, unless the court first determines that the public interests
involved do not outweigh the individual's interests. This is contrary to
the public policy recognized by the Illinois legislature in adopting the
statute creating the privilege that "assured patients of confidentiality
in relationships with their physician, as superior to the requirements
of the investigation." 38
2. There Is No Legislative Authority for Applying the Privilege
Differently In Criminal Cases
The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished the present case from
other cases that have applied the physician-patient privilege to protect
disclosure of patient names on the basis that these other cases in-
volved civil rather than criminal controversies.3 9 The court thereby
appeared to establish different standards for extending the scope of
the privilege in criminal versus civil actions. Although the court does
not set out these standards clearly, it hinted at a stricter standard for
criminal cases based on "the public's interest in the investigation of
criminal activities ...."40
The underlying legislative policy of the privilege, however, applies
equally to civil and criminal cases. In establishing the privilege, the
Illinois legislature recognized the patient's interest in maintaining
confidentiality in dealings with a physician.4 ' Furthermore, it has
been noted that "there is nothing inherent in the nature of a criminal
action to indicate that the legislature intended that the privilege
should not apply to such actions."42 Therefore, since there is nothing
in the language of the Illinois statute that limits the privilege to civil
cases, there is no reason to infer a legislative intent to differentiate
not involved and do not consent, even the names of such non-involved
patients.
Schechet v. Kesten, 372 Mich. 346, 351, 126 N.W.2d 718, 720-21 (1964).
38. People v. Calvo, 89 Ill. 130, 137, 432 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1982).
39. See, e.g., supra note 27.
40. People v. Florendo, 95 M1. 2d 155, 161, 447 N.E.2d 282, 285 (1983). The court noted
that the public has an interest "in maintaining the breadth of the grand jury's
power to conduct investigations necessary to ferret out criminal activity ....
This power should be accorded 'the broadest scope possible' consistent with con-
stitutional limitations." Id. at 158-59, 447 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting People v. Dorr,
47 Ill. 2d 458, 462, 265 N.E.2d 601, 608 (1970)). See also People v. Herbert, 108 Ill.
App. 3d 143, 150, 438 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (1982) ("Society's interests are thus best
served by a thorough and broad investigation. The grand jury must pursue all
available clues and examine all witnesses.").
41. People v. Herbert, 108 Ill. App. 3d 143, 438 N.E.2d 1255 (1982).
42. 7 A.L.R.3d 1460 (1960).
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
criminal applications.43
Other courts have recognized that the physician-patient privilege
may act as an obstacle in the fact-finding process, yet have declined to
apply the privilege differently in criminal cases. Accordingly, in up-
holding application of the privilege in a medical malpractice action,
the New Jersey Superior Court noted that:
[T]his Court is constrained to hold that the policy behind the physician-patient
privilege is of greater weight than the evidence it makes unavailable ....
None of the statutory exemptions from and exceptions to the privilege evince
any legislative intention to subordinate the benefits which inure to the rela-
tionship of patient-physician from the privilege to any countervailing benefit
to society. .... 44
Similarly, in People v. Bickham,45 the Ilinois Supreme Court held
that the statute providing for the physician-patient privilege in Illinois
shielded a doctor's records from the State's demand for production in
connection with a criminal investigation. In reaching that conclusion,
the Bickham court recognized that the legislative policy behind the
statute placed the confidentiality of the medical relationship above the
evidentiary requirements of a criminal investigation.4 6
Such reasoning seems equally persuasive in the present case,
wherein the issue is whether to extend application of the privilege to
protect disclosure of patients' names in a criminal investigation. Since
the Illinois Supreme Court implied that the privilege may be extended
to protect such information in certain cases,47 it should have looked to
the established legislative policy to guide its analysis. Furthermore, as
discussed above, there is no statutory justification for the court's
unique handling of the privilege in criminal cases. On the contrary, it
appears that the legislature intended the privilege to apply broadly in
43. See ILL. REV. STATs. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1979).
44. Osterman v. Ehrenworth, 106 N.J. Super. 515, 518, 256 A.2d 123, 126-27 (1969).
Thus the Osterman court upheld application of the privilege to prevent disclosure
of names and addresses of third persons not participating in the litigation, as well
as other information regarding the nature of their treatment.
45. 89 Ill. 2d 1, 431 N.E.2d 365 (1982).
46. Id. at 4, 431 N.E.2d at 368. Once the legislature has spoken and established a
policy regarding a particular issue, judges should defer to that legislative determi-
nation rather than proceed with an independent analysis. Thus, in another re-
cent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the policy supporting
legislative creation of the privilege may serve to restrict investigation in a crimi-
nal as well as civil case:
In Bickman we held that the statute providing for the physician-patient
privilege in Illinois shielded a doctor's records from the State's demand
for production in connection with a criminal investigation. In reaching
that conclusion we regarded the public policy recognized by the legisla-
ture in adopting the statute, which assured patients of confidentiality in
relationships with their physician, as superior to the requirements of the
investigation.
People v. Calvo, 89 Ill. 2d 130, 137, 432 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1982).
47. People v. Florendo, 92 Ill. 2d 155, 158, 447 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1983).
[Vol. 64:772
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all cases to encourage and protect free disclosure in the physician-pa-
tient relationship.
3. Disclosure of Patient Names Violates Privacy Rights
In reaching its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court disregarded the
defendant's argument that disclosure of the information sought would
infringe impermissibly on the women's constitutional right to privacy
and concluded that any resulting intrusion would be minimal.48 This
conclusion was based on the secrecy attendant to grand jury proceed-
ings and the fact that once contacted, the women could refuse to dis-
close any further information. However, in his dissent, Judge Simon
convincingly rebutted the majority's analysis, noting that: "[T]he wo-
men involved may be apprehensive that members of the grand jury or
court personnel serving the grand jury and having access to their
names in that capacity may be their neighbors, acquaintances or pro-
spective employers."49 Judge Simon therefore disagreed with the ma-
jority's contention that the resulting intrusion on the privacy of the
women involved would be minimal. He argued that:
Obviously the only reason the grand jury would need the names is so that the
women could be contacted. There is no way of knowing where the grand jury
investigation might lead and what impact it may have on the lives of the wo-
men whose names are furnished and their families .... The consequences of
the majority opinion can be catastrophic, uprooting lifesstyles and shattering
relationships.5 0
48. Id.
49. Id. at 159, 447 N.E.2d at 286 (Simon, J., dissenting). Similarly, in People ex rel
Dept. of Pub. Health v. Calvo, 89 M. 2d 130, 133, 432 N.E.2d 223, 225 (1982), the
Illinois Supreme Court recognized that there is no "guarantee that some of the
personnel in the State's Attorney's office or the grand jurors may not be ac-
quainted with persons whose names might be exposed, thus causing embarrass-
ment to those persons." In Calvo, the grand jury requested documents disclosing
names and other information regarding patients who had been treated for
veneral disease. The court held that the documents could not be released based
on a statute specifically protecting the confidentiality of records regarding
veneral disease. ILL REv. STATs. ch. 126, § 21 (1979).
50. People v. Florendo, 95 11l. 2d 155, 159, 447 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1983) (Simon, J., dis-
senting). Judge Simon provided the following illustrations of how the majority's
decision might affect individual women:
Consider the trauma a young, unmarried woman would suffer when she
is called upon at her parents' or relatives' home by process servers seek-
ing to subpoena her appearance before the grand jury for the purpose of
asking her if she would be willing to waive her physician-patient privi-
lege? Or, consider the case of a married woman whose husband does not
know she had an abortion, but finds out when the process server appears
at their home to summon her before the grand jury only for the purpose
of inquring whether she would be willing to waive her privilege ....
This is a strange way of investigating whether there have been criminal
violations and in fact smacks more of harassment than an investigation
carefully and professionally conducted and which the prosecuting au-
thorities have reason to believe is likley to be productive.
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It is generally accepted that courts have the power (and perhaps
duty) to supervise the use of grand jury subpoenas to gain testimony
and evidence in the course of investigations.5 1 This power is said to be
derived "from the penumbras of the Fourth Amendment's proscrip-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures .. .as well as from
the court's inherent ability to supervise the use of process to compel
the presence of witnesses, and to oversee the grand jury which it em-
panels."52 In Florendo, there was no showing of why the grand jury
needed the ordered names or even of the general nature of the crimi-
nal charges involved.53 This defect was recognized by the appellate
court, which indicated its concern regarding "the confusion caused in
this and possibly other cases by the failure of the grand jury to specify
the object of its investigation on the face of the subpoenas . ...- 54
However, both the appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court on
review failed to question the grand jury's need for the information
sought. Instead, the majority granted broad deference to the investi-
gatory function of the grand jury without judicial supervision.
Such unchecked deference to the grand jury seems unjust and im-
proper in the present case. The court justified its position by applying
a balancing test whereby the state's general interest in "maintaining
the breadth of the grand jury's power to conduct investigations neces-
sary to ferret out criminal activity" is weighed against the patient's
interest in "maintaining confidentiality in his or her medical dealings
with a physician."55 Here, the scales were deemed to tip in favor of
the state's criminal investigatory interest. It is, however, submitted
that the court's conclusion was faulty since it underestimated the
weight of the patient's privacy interest in light of recent case law.
Once again, it is important to consider that the underlying legisla-
tive purpose of the privilege is to protect patients from the embarass-
ment and invasion of privacy that disclosure may entail.56
Furthermore, in addition to the statutory basis for protecting such in-
formation, there is a general constitutionally protected privacy right
that should be considered. Accordingly, the United States Supreme
Court has held that although the Constitution does not explicitly men-
tion any right of privacy, "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
Id.
51. In re Seiffert, 446 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
52. Id. In a footnote, the majority noted that "[t]he Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has taken the position that the court must, in every case, whether or not a motion
to quash has been filed, satisfy itself of the propriety of a grand jury subpoena."
Id. at 1155 n.5.
53. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 447 N.E.2d 282 (1983).
54. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. App. 3d 601, 603 n.2, 420 N.E.2d 506, 507-08 n.2 (1981).
55. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 158, 447 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1983).
56. See supra note 34. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 98, at 213.
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certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the Constitution."5 7
The roots of this right have been found in the first, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.58
In particular, as regards compelled disclosure of confidential per-
sonal information or documents, courts have looked to the privacy
protections of the first and fourth amendments. For example, in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,59 the Supreme Court protected "the freedom
to associate and privacy in one's associations," noting that freedom of
association was a peripheral first amendment right.60 In that case, the
Court held that disclosure of membership lists of a constitutionally
valid association was impermissible "as entailing the liklihood of a
substantial restraint upon the exercise of petitioner's members of
their right to freedom of association." 6' Similarly, the Court has pro-
tected other forms of "association" that are less political in nature, and
pertain to the social, legal and economic benefit of the members.62
The right of "association" has been interpreted broadly to mean more
than a right to attend a meeting; it includes the right of individuals to
express their "attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or
by affiliation with it or by other lawful means ... [or by a ] form of
expression of opinion .... "63 Futhermore, the Court recognized that
compelled disclosure of an organization's membership lists "may in-
duce members to withdraw from the association and dissuade others
from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown
through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure." 64
Thus, the Court has expressly determined that "the First Amendment
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion."65
Such reasoning is equally applicable to the facts in Florendo. Here,
as in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,66 compelled disclosure is likely to sub-
stantially restrain individuals from "associating" with the group, here,
an abortion clinic. Since affiliation with such an organization is lawful
and has been impliedly protected by the Supreme Court,67 it seems a
violation of the women's privacy to reveal their identities. Unless wo-
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Id.
59. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
67. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court noted that the privacy right
encompassed a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. A
logical extension of this reasoning requires that women feel free to seek physi-
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men seeking abortion services or advice are assured that their affilia-
tion or relationship with an abortion clinic or specialist will be kept in
the utmost confidence, they are likely to avoid such facilities. Accord-
ingly, the dissent in Forendo concluded:
[T]he majority opinion will chill the exercise of the constitutional right recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade... to seek abortions. Women may in many instances
decide to forego an abortion rather than risk the possibility that their names
will be exposed to a grand jury in connection with seeking an abortion.6 8
Such reasoning is strikingly similar to that applied by the Supreme
Court to quash the production order for membership lists in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama:
[W]e think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama
membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of the petitioner and its
members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admit-
tedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw
from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of
exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the conse-
quences of this exposure. 6
9
In addition to the first amendment privacy right dicussed above,
the Court has determined that compulsory production of documents
may constitute an invasion of the right to privacy protected by the
fourth amendment. Under this rule, government investigative activi-
ties may violate fourth amendment privacy rights when there is an
intrusion into a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy."7 0 In such
constitutionally protected areas, the Court has recognized a "reason-
able expecation of privacy" as a sufficient foundation for assertion of
fourth amendment protection against an unreasonable search and
seizure by the government.7 1 Only a compelling state interest will jus-
tify such intrusion into an individual's privacy rights.72
The present case does involve intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected "zone of privacy" as detetermined by the Court: "This right of
privacy. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy." 7 3 Furthermore, it is safe to pre-
sume that a majority of women seeking treatment or advice at abor-
cians' advice in making this decision; indeed, such a policy seems desirable to in-
sure that a competent and informed decision is made.
68. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 166, 447 N.E.2d 282, 287-88 (1983) (citations
omitted).
69. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
70. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
71. Id. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan formulated a useful two-pronged test: "First that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 353
(Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
73. Id. at 153.
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tion clinics have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" regarding this
relationship. Thus, the state is required to demonstate a compelling
need for the information before the women's privacy will be im-
peached. This is not the case here. The state did not demonstrate a
compelling need for the names of women treated by the defendant
physician. Indeed, the court was not even cognizant of the nature of
the grand jury's investigation-much less their reasons for needing
the information sought. It is presumed that the grand jury intended to
individually contact the women thus identified in the hopes that they
might obtain waivers of their physician-patient privilege so as to un-
cover evidence relating to a criminal investigation of an unspecified
nature.74 However, such a purpose would not seem to satisfy the com-
pelling need standard necessary to justify such an intrusion into the
women's privacy.75
Whether one derives the applicable privacy right from the protec-
tions of the first, fourth, or any relevant constitutional amendment, it
is clear that information relating to a woman's abortion decision falls
under a judicially recognized "zone of privacy."76 Thus, at the very
least, it would be fair to require the state to present proof of a compel-
ling need to intrude into such a sensitive area of these women's lives.
This requirement of showing a compelling state interest is especially
prudent given the very real chilling effect such a decision may have on
women's exercise of their legally protected and personally important
abortion decisions. In reaching its decision, the majority in Florendo
neglected to undertake a full analysis of the women's applicable pri-
vacy rights; rather they summarily disposed of the issue based in large
part on "the secrecy atendant to grand jury proceedings."77 However,
only a year previous to this decision, the same court conceded that it
was possible that grand jurors would be "acquainted with persons
74. The dissent in Florenda noted that "[this is a strange way of investigating
whether there have been criminal violations and in fact smacks more of harass-
ment than an investigation carefully and professionally conducted and which the
prosecuting authorities have reason to believe is likely to be productive." People
v. Florendo, 95 IMI. 2d 155, 163, 447 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting).
75. In an earlier case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected similar evidence as insuffi-
cient to justify overriding the privilege:
Here the information is not sought by a criminal defendant to negate his
guilt, but rather the prosecutor seeks the information hoping that it will
lead to further evidence of guilt. While Hartel [People ex rel. Illinois
Judicial Inquiry Board v. Hartel, 72 IlM. 2d 225, 380 N.E.2d 801 (1978)]
may hold that confidentiality can be breached where due process rights
required disclosure, the decision cannot be read as holding that the privi-
lege of confidentiality must give way because the State's Attorney seeks
protected information in the hopes it will lead him to other evidence.
People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Health v. Calvo, 89 IM. 2d 130,134, 432 N.E.2d 223,226
(1982).
76. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 161, 447 N.E.2d 282, 285 (1983).
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whose names might be exposed, thus causing embarrassment to those
persons."7 8 Furthermore, the dissent noted that the grand jury obvi-
ously wanted the names in order to personally contact the women and
that such contact might prove very intrusive to the women.79
Therefore, even if the court did not consider patients' names pro-
tected under the statutory physician-patient privilege, such compelled
disclosure necessarily revealing the women's abortion-related activi-
ties was prohibited by the constitutionally based right of privacy.
Thus, the court should have required a finding of compelling state in-
terest before overriding the women's privacy rights and demanding
disclosure of their identities.
4. Public-Aid Recipients Do Not Waive Their Rights to Confidentiality
A final justification the Florendo majority offered in support of its
decision was based on the patients' status as public-aid recipients. The
majority noted that since the women used funds from the Department
of Public Aid to help pay for their treatment, their names must have
already been revealed to that agency.8 0 Thus the court implied that in
some sense the women had less reason to expect that their records
would be confidential. There is, however, no authority offered to sup-
port this conclusion. Accordingly, in his dissent, Judge Simon asserted
that:
It is highly discriminatory, in my judgment [sic], to sanction production of the
names on the ground that the women were public aid recipients.... How
one standard of waiver for private patients and another standard for public aid
recipients would be appropriate or justifiable I do not understand. The physi-
cian-patient privilege contemplates no such dichotomy.8 1
IV. CONCLUSION
Since there is no common law physician-patient privilege, a court
considering application of the privilege in a particular situation must
look to the statutory provisions creating the privilege in that state. In
addition, the court should rely on the legislative policies underlying
the privilege in interpreting the statute in specific cases. In the pres-
ent case, however, the Illinois Supreme Court appeared to disregard
the legislative purpose of the privilege in establishing a new condi-
tional privilege for disclosure of patients' names. In so doing, the
court gave great deference to the alleged fact-finding needs of the
grand jury in criminal cases. Thus, it appears that in any future crimi-
nal cases a grand jury need only request disclosure of patient names
78. People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Health v. Calvo, 89 Ill. 2d 130, 134, 432 N.E.2d 223, 225
(1982).
79. See supra note 50 and acompanying text.
80. People v. Florendo, 95 Ill. 2d 155, 158, 447 N.E.2d 282, 285 (1983).
81. Id. at 159, 447 N.E.2d at 286-87 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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for the court to deny application of physician-patient privilege on the
basis of a supervening public interest. Such a result goes against the
avowed purpose underlying the legislative establishment of the privi-
lege. It is, therefore, proposed that a better approach is to recognize
that in certain contexts (such as in the present case) release of a pa-
tient's name may be protected under the statutory physician-patient
privilege without initial judicial application of a balancing test.
Furthermore, there is a constitutionally based right of privacy that
must be considered. If the desired information relates to a constitu-
tionally protected zone of privacy, the court should not intrude with-
out a showing of compelling state interest. Since there was no such
showing in the present case and there was no waiver of the statutorily
and constitutionally protected privacy rights attendant to the women's
abortion-related activities, the defendant should not have been re-
quired to disclose the requested information to the grand jury.
Susan Berney-Key, '86
